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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel K. Keyes, II, appeals from his judgment of conviction for first degree 
arson. Mr. Keyes was convicted following a jury trial and the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. Mr. Keyes now appeals, and he 
asserts that the district court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after an expert witness 
for the State invaded the province of the jury by stating his belief that the fire was 
deliberately set by Mr. Keyes. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 11, 200S, Helen Howell telephoned 911 to 
report that the duplex next to her home was on fire. (Trial Tr., p.55, Ls.1S-21.) After 
she called 911, she went to the back yard of the duplex and saw her neighbor, 
Mr. Keyes, trying to extinguish the fire with a garden hose. (Trial Tr., p.59, Ls.3-19.) 
Desiree Eckard lived at the residence. (Trial Tr., p.90, Ls.7-9.) She had been in a 
relationship with Mr. Keyes and they had lived at the residence together. (Trial 
Tr., p.92, Ls.11-25.) 
On the day before the fire, Ms. Eckard had been informed that Mr. Keyes was 
being released from the Kootenai County Jail; Mr. Keyes had been incarcerated for 
violating a no-contact order issued with regard to Ms. Eckard. (Trial Tr., p.97, Ls.3-5, 
p.73, Ls.10-15.) About a week before Mr. Keyes was released, Ms. Eckard had made 
the decision to end the relationship. (Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.22-25/) 
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Mr. Keyes went to the residence after being released and Ms. Eckard told him 
that she was going to end the relationship. (Trial Tr., p.117, Ls.22-25.) According to 
Ms. Eckard, Mr. Keyes told her that she needed to leave while it was still safe. (Trial 
Tr., p.118, Ls.2-5.) Ms. Eckard gathered some of her belongings and her pets and left 
the residence. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.2-20.) She stated that she took her pet birds 
because Mr. Keyes had previously threatened to "roast" them. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.16-
20.) 
Mr. Keyes testified as to his role in the fire. He explained that when he was 
released from jail, he went home expecting to live with Ms. Eckard because "we were 
engaged, and she was pregnant with our kid. I didn't see anything coming." (Trial 
Tr., p.395, Ls.3-25.) When she informed him of her plans, he became upset. (Trial 
Tr., p.396, Ls.i-7.) He stayed at the residence for approximately an hour and left to get 
some money, cigarettes, vodka and orange juice. (Trial Tr., p.399, Ls.4-8.) He made a 
couple of drinks and tried to relax for a while. (Trial Tr., p.399, Ls.14-16.) He stated 
that at around 7:00 pm, he decided to start a fire in the fireplace. (Trial Tr., p.400, 
Ls.16-23.) He became "extremely" intoxicated. (Trial Tr., p.402, Ls.10-1i.) 
He testified that "during the night I was throwing a whole bunch - you know -
papers and junk mail and all kinds of stuff in there." (Trial Tr., p.402, Ls.i5-i8.) He 
acknowledged that he threw some of Ms. Eckard's clothing and a jewelry box into the 
fire. (Trial Tr., p.404, L.i8 - p.406, L.20.) Mr. Keyes slept for a while, and when he 
work up, he 
looked over at the fireplace, and my fire had pretty much died down. At 
the bottom of my fireplace, it was all like the red embers, coals, whatever 
you want to call it, everything that burned. That was just kind of glowing, 
but there above there's like a grill along the top a bunch of slats. I don't 
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know what it is, but that was glowing red. And I thought, 'that's weird. I've 
never seen that before.' 
(Trial Tr., p.4i0, Ls.i-7.) He went into the garage to investigate this glow because the 
back of the chimney was in the garage. (Trial Tr., p.4ii, Ls.i6-2i.) As soon as he 
opened the garage door, "smoke and flames just came out." (Trial Tr., p.4i2, Ls.8-i2.) 
He picked up a garden hose in an attempt to extinguish the fire. (Trial Tr., p.4i2, LS.i4-
20.) He eventually went out to the front of the house and saw that his car was catching 
fire. (Trial Tr., p.4i8, Ls.9-i5.) He got into the car and backed out of the driveway very 
quickly. (Trial Tr., p.4i9, Ls.i-4.) Drove down the street "as fast as I could because 
there was huge amounts of fire on my car." (Trial Tr., p.4i9, Ls.7-9.) The reason that 
he did not return to the residence was because he was panicked and drunk. (Trial 
Tr., p.422, Ls.2i-22.) 
Steven Field, who was in the duplex that evening, testified that he smelled a 
flarnmable solvent that evening, but wasn't going to interfere in the affairs of the folks 
next door." (Trial Tr., p.209, Ls.23-25.) Mr. Field had worked in a painting store and 
worked daily with paint thinners and solvents. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.i-8.) Mr. Keyes 
denied using any kind of solvent or paint thinner in the fire. (Tr., p.428, Ls.3-i4.) 
Brian Halvorson, a fire investigator, also testified. (Trial Tr., p.262, Ls.5-8.) He 
testified that there were two separate origins of the fire and that the fire was intentionally 
lit. (Trial Tr., p.290, Ls.6-i8.) Glenn Lauper, the deputy chief with the Coeur d'Alene 
Fire Department, also testified. (Trial Tr., p.330, Ls.9-i7.) He stated that he believed 
that the garage was a potential point of origin for the fire. (Trial Tr., p.339, Ls.ii-i4.) 
He believed the fire could also have originated in the living room. (Trial Tr., p.339, 
Ls.i8-25.) When asked, based upon his training and experience, whether he had an 
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opinion as to the origin of the fire, Deputy Lauper stated, "it's an incendiary fire. The fire 
was deliberately set by the defendant." (Trial Tr., p.350, Ls.22-23.) 
Counsel for Mr. Keyes objected and moved for a mistrial. (Trial Tr., p.350, LS.24-
25.) The district court responded, 
The objection is sustained. The jury will disregard the statements of the 
witness attributing fault to the defendant. That's the province of the jury. 
The witness knows and should know and counsel should know that that is 
not proper for him to be stating. And you will disregard it. That is your 
function. That is not his function. 
Request for mistrial is denied. 
(Trial Tr., p.351, Ls.1-8.) 
Mr. Keyes was charged by Information with one count of arson in the first degree, 
I.C. § 18-802. (R. p.54.) He was convicted following a jury trial. (R., p.211.) The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. (Trial 
Tr., p. 550, Ls.14-21.) Mr. Keyes appealed. (R., p.263.) He asserts that the district 
court erred by failing to grant a mistrial following Deputy Lauper's testimony. 
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ISSUE 
Did Deputy Lauper's testimony that Mr. Keyes had deliberated started the fire 
impermissibly invade the province of the jury? 
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ARGUMENT 
Deputy Lauper's Testimony Regarding Whether Mr. Keyes Deliberately Set the Fire 
Improperly Invaded The Province Of The JUry And The District Court Erred By Failing 
To Grant A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
In this case, Deputy Lauper testified as to the ultimate issue for the jury's 
determination: whether Mr. Keyes deliberately set the fire. The prosecutor elicited this 
opinion as expert testimony. Because the issue of whether Mr. Keyes deliberately set 
the fire was the ultimate question for the jury to determine, Deputy Lauper's testimony 
was improper. While the district court sustained Mr. Keyes' objection, the district court 
erred by failing to grant the motion for a mistrial. 
B. Deputy Lauper's Testimony Regarding Whether Mr. Keyes Deliberately Set the 
Fire Improperly Invaded The Province Of The JUry And The District Court Erred 
By Failing To Grant A Mistrial 
Expert witnesses may testify in the form of an opinion provided that: (1) they are 
properly qualified as an expert by their knowledge, skill, experience, or training; and 
(2) their specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. Idaho Rule of Evidence 704 also provides that 
opinion testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact." I.R.E. 704. 
However, Idaho case law consistently recognizes that the provisions of I.R.E. 
704, which permits opinion testimony that embraces an ultimate issue, must be read in 
conjunction with I.R.E. 702. See, e.g., State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688,696,760 P.2d 
27, 35 (1988). Specifically, where the expert opinion testimony only serves to 
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"impermissibly evaluate the circumstances and render the same conclusion the jury was 
asked to render by its verdict," then such testimony is improperly admitted. Id.; see also 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,768,864 P.2d 596, 606 (1993); State v. Johnson, 
119 Idaho 852, 855, 810 P.2d 1138, 1141 (1991). 
The Court in Hester adopted the following language and reasoning of the Kansas 
Supreme Court in State v. Lash, 699 P.2d 49 (Kan. 1985): 
[T]he opinion testimony of experts on the ultimate issue or issues is not 
admissible without limitations. Such testimony is admissible only insofar 
as the opinion will aid the jury in the interpretation of technical facts or 
when it will assist the jury in understanding the material in evidence .... 
Where the normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors permit them 
to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances, expert 
conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. 
Hester, 114 Idaho at 696, 760 P.2d at 35 (internal citation omitted). 
Where an expert testifies as to his or her opinion as to an ultimate issue in a 
case, and where such testimony is based on specialized experience and training such 
that a lay juror could not be expected to meaningfully interpret the evidence on his own, 
this testimony impermissibly invades on the province of the jury and should not be 
admitted. Id. Admission of expert testimony that invades the province of the jury 
constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. 1 See State v. Walters, 120 
Idaho 46,48, 813 P.2d 857, 859 (1991). In the context of an arson expert testifying as 
to the ultimate issue, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
There is little question that Dillard's opinion was prejudicial to Walters' 
defense. When an arson expert declares that it was the defendant 
who set the fire in the house, there can be little doubt that the jury 
was impressed and influenced by the authoritative statement. Had 
1 Both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I § 7 of the Idaho 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury. See, e.g., 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005). 
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Dillard been prevented from declaring his damaging opinion, there is at 
the least a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Most certainly, that probability is "sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Id., at 56-57, 813 P.2d at 867-68 (emphasis added). In this case, the district court 
acknowledged that the testimony was improper, sustained the objection, and 
admonished the jury that it should not consider the testimony. (Trial Tr., p.351, Ls.1-7.) 
This was not sufficient, however, as the district court should have granted a mistrial 
because the testimony so infected the proceedings that it was impossible to "unring the 
bell" and Deputy Lauper was not "prevented from declaring" his damaging opinion. 
Motions for a mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. The Rule 
states, in relevant part, "[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, 
when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct 
inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the 
defendant of a fair tria\. " \. C. R. 29.1. 
The standard of review when a district court denies a motion for a mistrial is well 
established. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial 
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which 
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial 
has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a 
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible 
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident 
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. 
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State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P .3d 1055 (2003) (quoting State v. 
Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983))). 
[T)he impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal 
system, the Chapman harmless-error analysis cannot apply. We have 
recognized that "some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S., at 23, 87 S.Ct., at 827. The right to an impartial 
adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a right. Id., at 23, n. 8, 87 S.Ct., at 
828, n. 8, citing, among other cases, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 
S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (impartial judge). As was stated in 
Witherspoon, a capital defendant's constitutional right not to be sentenced 
by a "tribunal organized to return a verdict of death" surely equates with a 
criminal defendant's right not to have his culpability determined by a 
"tribunal 'organized to convict.' " 391 U.S., at 521, 88 S.Ct., at 1776, 
quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294, 67 S.Ct. 1613, 1630, 91 
L.Ed. 2043 (1947). 
Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987). Mr. Keyes acknowledges that the district 
court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement and that 
this Court presumes that the jury followed the district court's instructions. See State v. 
Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 
Idaho 478, 481,927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). However, Mr. Keyes asserts that 
Deputy Lauper's testimony so infected the proceedings that the only sufficient remedy 
was a mistrial. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, the type of opinion expressed by Deputy 
Lauper would impress and influence the jury because it is such an authoritative 
statement. Walters, 120 Idaho at 56-57, 813 P.2d at 867-68. And the court stated that 
the only way the jury would not have been impacted is if the expert was prevented from 
giving the opinion. Id. In this case, Deputy Lauper gave his opinion, and there can be 
little doubt that such an opinion would have impressed and influenced the jury. Further, 
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this case hinged on whether the jury believed Mr. Keyes that the fire occurred 
accidentally and that he only intended to light a fire in the fireplace, or if it believed the 
fire department witnesses who testified as to multiple sources of origin. Considering the 
evidence as a whole, Mr. Keyes respectfully submits that the district court erred by 
failing to grant a mistrial once Deputy Lauper improperly testified that Mr. Keyes had 
deliberately set the fire. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Keyes requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 21 st day of May, 2010. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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